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In recent work about know how, Rylean regress arguments have largely
dropped out of focus. They play little role in the anti-intellectualist ar-
guments of various kinds in the papers collected in Bengson and Moett
(2011). They are used as something like target practice by intellectualists
like Jason Stanley (2011), who uses the rst chapter of his book to dispose
of them before getting onto the real business. And even Yuri Cath, who in
other work has launched sharp critiques of intellectualism, has argued that
the regress arguments for anti-intellectualism don't work (Cath, 2011, 2013).
The majority view seems to be that Carl Ginet (1975) basically showed these
arguments didn't work, and it's time to move onto other considerations for
or against intellectualism.
I think this isn't exactly right. In particular, I think regress arguments
can be used to show a few dierent things. For one, they can be used to refute
a precisication of this thesis, which plays a key role in some intellectualist
arguments.
 Only volitional actions are normatively assessable.
Once we have seen that thesis is false, we need a new picture of how action
can be at once intelligent and non-volitional. Some considerations similar
to those adduced by Ryle (1949) concerning agents who either concentrate
on irrelevant considerations, or ignore relevant ones, show there is a role
for intellectual skill that cannot be identied with any piece of knowledge
that. And some further considerations, similar to those adduced by Cath
(2011), suggest that this intellectual skill can't even be constituted by a
piece of knowledge that. So regress arguments, I'll argue, can do quite a
lot to motivate the thought that there was a lot wrong with the intellectual
picture Ryle tried to attack.
The position I'm going to be defending is a long way from the strongest
kinds of Rylean position that contemporary intellectualists such as Stanley
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2are focussed on arguing against. My focus is primarily on intellectual skill.
This has some relevance for debates about know how, though less relevance
for debates about the semantics of know how ascriptions. This focus on
skill rather than know how ascriptions is hardly novel; it is continuing a
trend that we see exemplied in recent work by, inter alia, Carlotta Pavese
(2013), Ellen Fridland (2014) and Cheng-Hung Tsai (2014). And in fact
that conclusions I'll draw here are, I think, similar to the ones that Fridland
draws.
Once we move towards thinking about skill, we can get varieties of anti-
intellectualism that are very dierent from those that were the focus of
most philosophical discussion until very recently. For example, the anti-
intellectualist view I'm defending is consistent with the following four theses.
 Instances of intellectual skill are usually, and perhaps always, not hap-
pily reported using know how ascriptions.
 Know how ascriptions are rarely, if ever, reports of intellectual skill,
and are frequently reports of propositional knowledge.
 Intellectual skill is guided by, and dependent on, propositional knowl-
edge.
 Propositional knowledge is not behaviourally inert.
Not just is the view consistent with these four, I'm fairly condent that the
last three at least are true. But that's all consistent with the view that
intellectual skill is not itself propositional knowledge. And it's all consistent
with the view that we can learn philosophically signicant conclusions from
Ryle's regress arguments.
One disclaimer before I start. Although this paper is heavily inuenced
by Ryle (1945, 1949), and sympathetic interpreters of Ryle such as Jennifer
Hornsby (2011), I make no attempt at Ryle exegesis here. I think there's a
decent case to be made that Ryle was sympathetic to the position defended
here, but I'm going to leave that debate for another day.
1 The Volitional Regress
Dene a volitional action to be one that is preceeded by a volition to per-
form that very action. And say an action is normatively assessable if
it can properly be assessed using terms like praiseworthy, blameworthy, in-
telligent or stupid. Note that I'm ruling out assessments as good or bad
as versions of normative assessment, in the relevant sense. Someone who
has a good digestive system is not, thereby, normatively assessable in the
stipulative sense I'm using. Both of these denitions are to an extent stip-
3ulative; the terms `volitional' and `normative' can sensibly receive many
other denitions. Still, I will stick to these denitions here. In light of those
stipulations, consider the following set of propositions.
1. Only volitional actions are normatively assessable.
2. The action of forming a volition is normatively assessable.
3. Some public actions, such as making a move in a chess game, are
normatively assessable.
It should be obvious that this leads to a regress. Whether the kind of regress
in question is impossible, or even impractical, is a tricky question. (See
Robert K. Meyer (1987) for some of the complications that arise when trying
to reason about regresses.) But it is commonly assumed in this literature
that the kind of regress that these three premises lead to is problematic.
Since the third premise is obviously true, the issue is whether the rst
or second is false. But it seems that second is true as well. Just as we
can assess a person's actions as praise or blameworthy, intelligent or stupid,
we can assess the process by which she decided to perform those actions
in the same way. Consider two people who make the same, as it turns
out great, chess move in the same situation. The rst notices an initially
appealing counter to her move, and sees after careful thought that it won't
work. The second simply doesn't notice the counter, and is stumped when
her opponent makes it. It seems the rst has engaged in a more intelligent
practice of volition formation than the second. Or imagine a third player,
whose initial analysis of the move starts by considering a recipe for arroz
con leche. Unless there turns out to be an unnoticed connection here, this
looks even less intelligent than the second player.
On the other hand, the rst premise is rather unintuitive. To borrow an
example from Angela Smith (2005), it is blameworthy to forget a friend's
birthday, although forgettings are rarely volitional. So we must reject 1 or
2, and while 1 is subject to independent counterexample, 2 seems indepen-
dently plausible. So 1 must be false.1
That's already a substantial conclusion. Something like 1 is behind
William Alston's famous, and inuential, arguments against deontological
approaches to epistemology (Alston, 1988). But the negation of 1 is not a
novel claim; I'm saying nothing here that Smith didn't say in her rejection
of the \volitional view of responsibility" (Smith, 2005, 238). And similar
1This argument is obviously rather quick, and I doubt will persuade someone already
convinced of 1. For much more extensive arguments against 1, see the Smith, Ryan and
Steup articles cited in the text, plus Adams (1985).
4views have been put forward by other critics of Alston such as Sharon Ryan
(2003) and Matthias Steup (2008).
But still, the fact that 1 is false seems not to have been suciently
appreciated in the recent literature on intellectualism. To see one place
where it is relevant, consider this set of propositions, which also seem to
trigger a regress.
4. Intelligent action requires the triggering of a prior representation of
knowledge relevant to the action.
5. The triggering of a representation, when done well, is an intelligent
action.
6. Some public actions, such as making a move in a chess game, are
intelligent.
Again, these propositions obviously trigger a regress, and that seems like
good evidence to take one of them to be false. This is very similar to one of
the regresses Jason Stanley considers in chapter 2 of his (2011). And Stanley
thinks the false proposition is 5. He writes \Triggering a representation can
be done poorly or well. But this does not show it can be done intelligently
or stupidly." (Stanley, 2011, 16) Indeed, he writes that since \triggering
representations is something we do automatically" (Stanley, 2011, 16) a
statement like 5 is a \manifest implausibility" (Stanley, 2011, 16). But the
argument here relies on 1. If you think things done non-volitionally can
be intelligent or stupid, it isn't too much of a stretch to think that things
done automatically can be intelligent or stupid. Indeed, Smith's birthday
example is already enough to undermine Stanley's point; forgetting a friend's
birthday seems automatic in the sense he has in mind, but is also stupid.
More generally, it seems very intuitive to describe everyday cases in such
a way that 5 must be true. For example, Billy asks Suzy whether she thinks
Jill's party will be a success. There are a lot of things that are common
knowledge between the two of them. One is that Jill is a procient party
host. Another is that Jill has invited all of their colleagues, including Jack.
Another is that parties which Jack attends are rarely successes. But Suzy
thinks for a minute, remembers that Jack is away in Ohio, and says that it
will be a success.
It was smart of Suzy to think about Jack's whereabouts. It wasn't,
perhaps, necessary. If she'd just reasoned from Jill's general prociency to
the success of the party, she would have got to the right conclusion. But
it was better to note a possible complication, and check that it wouldn't
actually get in the way.
5It would have been stupid to perform the same activity for many other
kinds of possible complications. If Suzy had thought to herself, \The party
will be a disaster if there's an alien invasion in the middle of it, but there's no
reason to think the aliens will invade just now, so I'll keep on thinking it will
be a success," that would have been stupid. Other possible complications
are not stupid to consider, but they are intellectual mistakes. The party
won't be a success if there's a police raid in the middle, based on a mistaken
view the police have about where a particular drug dealer lives. Police do
make mistakes, so even if Jill isn't a drug dealer, this could be a genuine
concern, depending on how nearby the mistakes are. But if the nearest
mistake was a botched raid in a neighbouring state in the previous year, it's
wrong for Suzy to worry about this before answering Billy's question.
Stanley's view has to be that I've been misusing adjectives systematically
through the last two paragraphs. I shouldn't have said that it was smart of
Suzy to consider Jack's whereabouts, or that it would have been stupid to
consider the alien invasion. Rather, it was just her cognitive system working
well when she considered Jack, and would have been working poorly had
she considered the aliens, and sub-optimally had she considered the police.
This doesn't seem at all the natural way to describe the case to me, in part
because I'm not sure I see the dierence Stanley is hinting at. Intelligence
just is the good operation of the cognitive system, and stupidity its poor
operation.
So these two regresses lead to two interesting conclusions. First, some
non-volitional actions are normatively assessable. Second, intelligent action
does not always require the prior triggering of a representation of relevant
knowledge. Both of these are interesting. Both of these are negations of part
of what you might consider \the intellectualist picture". (Cath (2013) notes
that Ryle often refers to the regresses as arguments against this picture, not
against any particular thesis.) But neither of them get us very close to a
distinction between know how and know that, or between intellectual skill
and know that. The next section addresses some ways we might move closer
to arguments against more central intellectualist claims.
2 Picturing Intelligent Action
As noted in the introduction, my plan is not to oer an argument with
regress like premises, and the conclusion that intellectual skill is distinct from
propositional knowledge, or that know how is distinct from propositional
knowledge. What I do want to do is sketch a picture of human intelligence
(at a very high level of generality) that presupposes that intellectual skill is
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the eect that no similarly plausible picture exists in which intellectual skill
and propositional knowledge are identied. The thought here is not that
the only way out of the regress involves distinguishing skill and knowledge
{ and perhaps distinguishing know how from know that { but rather that
the best way out does.
Start with a well known, if not obviously authentic, exchange.2
Oscar Wilde: I wish I'd said that.
James McNeill Whistler: You will Oscar; you will.
Assuming this really happened, that's a clever response. It's an occupational
hazard of philosophers to think that the ability to come up with quick, clever
responses is somehow central to intelligence. But we can reject that wildly
implausible view without thinking that it's wrong to think of these quips as
a manifestation of a kind of intelligence.
Now let's think of how someone could have come up with this response.
Even before we start researching the neural patterns behind quips like this,
we can be pretty sure the following is not what happened in Whistler's brain.
He rst made an exhaustive list of all possible responses, from \Green ideas
sleep furiously" to what he actually said, then gured out which would be
best, then produced the best one. On this wildly implausible model, the
reply would be intelligent because it would reect the speaker's ability to
properly evaluate this list of responses. That's implausible because the list
is simply too big. Indeed, it is in principle innitely large. The list is too
big to survey not just consciously, but subconsciously.
Coming up with a response like this requires rst coming up with a
narrower list of possible responses, and then evaluating which is best from
that list.3 There's a romantic model of intellect where the list in question
consists of just the reply actually issued. On this model the perfect reply
appears fully and perfectly formed in the mind of the intelligent person.
2I thought this example was purely ctional, coming from the Monty Python sketch
reproduced in Dempsey (2012, p. 741). But Ben Wolfson pointed out to me that it's
recorded as a true story in Hadley (1903, p. 255).
It's actually striking how few really good o-the-cu quips there are in recorded history.
The famous one attributed to Wilde, \I have nothing to declare but my genius", is probably
apocryphal, and in any case sounds prepared. Lists of famous come-backs and ripostes
are usually crowded with written responses. Word play is hard.
3Or, perhaps even more plausibly, coming up with a short list of possible openings,
choosing the best, and doing what one can to gure out how to complete the response
while uttering the start of it. Thanks here to Ben Wolfson.
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should give that much credit. It's an empirical question how many possible
replies are represented in the mind in a situation like this, before the chosen
reply is issued. What's not an empirical issue is whether the list of possible
replies that is represented in the mind is nite or innite. It simply must be
nite, which means that there must be better and worse lists to consider.
And that suggests that there is some skill involved in coming up with the
list.
One could reject this last conclusion. One could try saying that the
coming up with a list of possible replies is no manifestation of skill, but the
skill is only involved in the evaluation and selection of replies. But this seems
to generate a bizarre explanation about why the less skilled interlocutor
comes up with worse replies. The model, presumably, is that the lack of skill
does not explain having the wrong list of replies to choose between. Rather,
what explains their less skilled reply must simply be that they misevaluated
the possible replies. But that doesn't t the observed data. It's much easier
to see of someone else's reply that it was clever than it is to come up with
a clever reply.
It could also be objected that the model I've suggested is much too sim-
ple. It isn't just that the mind issues a list of options, then evaluates them,
and then selects the best. A more plausible model involves more recursive
steps. The mind rst generates a list of options, selects the best, then gen-
erates a list of renements of that best option, selects the best of those, and
so on. Perhaps when we consider supercial forms of intelligence, such as
quips, it makes sense to consider a `one-step' model, where a list is generated
and evaluated, followed by a speech. But when one is choosing one's words
carefully, as in say Wilde's writing, the simple model I've described feels
much too simple.
But although the simple model is too simple for considered writing, the
general structure must be right. Even a writer working at a leisurely pace,
such as Joyce taking decades to write Finnegans Wake, doesn't have time to
consider, even subconsciously, all possible constructions. There are still too
many. And nor is it true that the dierence between Joyce's skill and ours
is that he realises the value of the sentences we all represent. The rest of us
didn't simply misjudge the value of \Nobirdy aviar soar anywing to eagle it"
(Joyce, 1939/2012, p. 505); we simply didn't token it. The ability to token
mental representations like that is part of what Joyce's genius consists in.
I've focussed so far on cases where it is a priori implausible that human
thinkers start by surveying the range of possible things they could do. It
is also interesting to look at cases where this is in principle possible, but
8doesn't seem to happen in practice. There have been, traditionally, major
dierences in the style of play between human and computer chess players.
(Since so many young players learn from machines these days, Kasparov
(2010) suggests these dierences are diminishing.4) This isn't necessarily
because humans can't consider all options on the chess board. Usually there
will be fewer than a hundred available moves, and a human could consider
each. But that isn't, it seems, how humans think. They don't allocate
equal resources to working through each of the possible options. As a result,
computers often come up with surprising kinds of moves. Now computers are
actually very good at chess, so these pre-deliberative allocations of cognitive
resources may not have been optimal. Perhaps it would have been better
for traditional chess players to spend more time thinking through unlikely
progressions of the game. But it is evidence that even when we could use an
unintelligent method for beginning inquiry, namely recursively generating
the possible options, we prefer to use intelligent methods.
So intelligent action, at least in humans in the kinds of situations humans
normally nd themselves in, consists in part of making intelligent choices
about where to start inquiry. Given that intelligent action need not be
volitional, as we established above, it isn't surprising that being intelligent
consists in part in starting in the right places. But perhaps this intelligence
is just itself a kind of knowledge. It is, we might suspect, just the knowledge
of what a good starting point will be. Or, since we will want to start with all
and only the considerations relevant to a given inquiry, it is just knowledge
of what is relevant.
The resulting picture is both perfectly intellectualist, and immune to the
regresses considered above. The intelligent person knows what is relevant
to what inquiry. Her choice of starting points is guided by this knowledge.
(The `guidance' metaphor recurs frequently in Stanley's work.) This isn't
because it leads to a volition to start just here. Such a volition would be
self-defeating, since in the relevant sense of `start', by the time this volition
is formed, one has already started, and indeed started elsewhere. Nor can
she be guided by even a triggered representation of this knowledge of rele-
vance. Again, if that happens, she is in the relevant sense starting elsewhere.
But perhaps propositional knowledge can guide directly; not by generating
volitions, and without even being represented anew.
Now I don't think this picture is right. But it isn't incoherent either,
and it takes work to see why it isn't right.
4Thanks to Bernard Kobes and John Collins for helpful discussions about the chess
examples.
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active, while knowledge is passive. The thought is that the person who knows
a lot is like the Tortoise in Louis Carroll's dialogue (Carroll, 1895), only able
to add more premises but never to reach a conclusion. It is only with skill
that we can get to the conclusion. Stanley rightly objects to this argument
on the grounds that it just isn't true that knowledge is passive in the relevant
sense. We should not, as Stanley puts it, \over-intellectualize knowing that".
(Stanley, 2012, p. 773). (A similar point is made in Stalnaker (2012).)
Knowing that p is not just a matter of having p written in a knowledge box
somewhere in the brain; it can in part be constituted by active dispositions.
A better argument looks at the very dierent modal proles of intellec-
tual skill and knowledge of relevance. Someone can know that something is
irrelevant and yet lack the skill to ignore it; or they can know that some-
thing is relevant and yet lack the skill to consider it in a timely manner.
Examples from the other direction, where there is skill without knowledge,
are a little more contentious, but we'll look at some possible cases of those
too. But rst we'll run through two examples to show how easy it is to have
knowledge without skill.
Alice has spent a lot of money on video-conferencing equipment. But
it isn't working at all well, and she now has to decide whether to try and
patch it into something better, or buy a whole new system. She knows the
sunk cost fallacy is a fallacy; that buying a new system would make the
previous purchases a waste is no reason to not buy a new system, especially
if doing so is good value compared to the cost of buying a `patch'. But
she can't bring herself to ignore this fact when deliberating. Even though
she eventually makes the right decision and buys new equipment, she takes
much longer about this than she would have if, say, the existing equipment
was old enough that she could easily conceptualise it as obsolete.
Bob is trying to solve a puzzle about the properties of functions from
rationals to rationals. He knows that it is often helpful, when solving such
puzzles, to transform the puzzle into one about functions from ordered pairs
of integers to ordered pairs of integers. He knows that in the sense that if
you asked him whether it could be useful to consider that transformation of
the puzzle, he would immediately say yes, and this answer would come with
the phenemenology of recollection, not of new insight. But no one does ask
him that question, and the transformation in question simply never occurs
to Bob. Since the untransformed puzzle is very hard, while the transformed
puzzle is manageable, Bob never solves the problem.
It seems to me that what's happened in both cases is that the agent has
some knowledge, but is incapable of using it. What they lack is a skill. In
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particular, they lack what Fridland (2014, 2746) calls `selective, top-down,
automatic attention'. Alice keeps attending to something she should not,
even though she knows she should not. Bob fails to attend to something
he should, although in some sense he knows that is what he should attend
to. Bob's case is one of the reasons I nd the picture of skill presented
by Stanley and Williamson (forthcoming) unhelpful. They say skill is a
disposition to form knowledge. But Bob has the important knowledge. The
disposition he lacks is the disposition to activate that knowledge, and let it
guide deliberation. That's what constitutes his lack of skill.
It's true that knowledge isn't completely passive. If Alice never appealed
to the fact that the sunk cost fallacy is a fallacy in her reasoning, we wouldn't
say that she knows it. If none of Bob's answers were guided by the existence
of natural and useful transformations between rational numbers and ordered
pairs of integers, we wouldn't say he knows such transformations are natural
and useful. I'm here agreeing with Stanley and Stalnaker that knowledge
is itself a kind of disposition. And intellectual skill is a kind of disposition
too. But they are very dierent dispositions. In particular, they have very
dierent triggering conditions. Bob lacks some skill because he does not
call to mind this fact about rational numbers right now. He has the salient
knowledge about rational numbers because he is disposed to use the facts
in question often enough.
So intellectual skill and knowledge of relevance have dierent manifes-
tation conditions, and so they are not identical. But we can say something
stronger than that. The cases of Alice and Bob are not in any way unusual.
Examples where we forget the salience of some consideration, or can't get
an irrelevant point out of our heads, are frequent. In principle, one could
respond to the arguments I've made so far by saying that while knowledge
of relevance is not identical to skill, nevertheless the two are as closely linked
as, say, a material object and the matter that constitutes it. And if I had
to resort to bizarre cases of the kind we torture introductory students with
to make my point, I'd say that would be the right response. But given how
normal Alice and Bob's cases are, this seems like the wrong move. Skill
and knowledge don't just come apart in theory, they come apart in practice,
frequently.
3 Four Objections
So far I've defended three theses that are in tension with some forms of
intellectualism. They are:
 Some non-volitional actions are normatively assessable.
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 Not all intelligent action is preceded by the triggering of representa-
tions of relevant knowledge.
 Intellectual skill, in particular the intellectual skill associated with
starting inquiry in the right place, is not identical to any piece of
propositional knowledge.
While this doesn't show that, for instance, know how and know that are
distinct, and is completely silent on what we should say about know how
ascriptions, it does undermine some intellectualist programs. I'll conclude
with some objections either to the arguments I've put forward, or to their
signicance.
Objection: Even if all of this is true, there may still be a sense in which
intellectualism is true. After all, it could still be that knowledge guides
action in a suitable way. (Compare (Stanley, 2011, p. 2).)
Reply : This could be true. Whether it is a win for intellectualism de-
pends a bit on the boring question of how we settle the term `intellectual-
ism', and a bit on more interesting questions about priority. Let's start by
distinguishing ve theories we might call intellectualist.
Identity Intellectualism - The possession of an intellectual skill just is
the possession of a piece of knowledge.
Constitution Intellectualism - The possession of an intellectual skill is,
always, constituted by a piece of knowledge.
Weak Constitution Intellectualism - The possession of an intellectual
skill is, often, constituted by a piece of knowledge.
Causal Intellectualism - The possession of an intellectual skill is, always,
caused by the possession of a piece of knowledge.
Weak Causal Intellectualism - The possession of an intellectual skill is,
often, caused by the possession of a piece of knowledge.
This paper has been arguing against Identity Intellectualism. I think the
falsity of this is as much as we could reasonably hope to prove using regress
arguments. (I think I'm here agreeing with Wiggins (2009) and Hornsby
(2011).) And the considerations behind the regress argument do, I think,
show it to be false. If someone wants to insist that by intellectualism, they
mean something weaker than this, I'm not going to quarrel over terminology.
I'll just note that Identity Intellectualism is an interesting, and false, thesis.
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The arguments here are clearly not arguments against either form of
Weak Intellectualism. Indeed, they are naturally understood as the kind of
cases that conrm Weak Intellectualism. Mathematics students, like Bob,
train by learning a lot of mathematical facts. And it's hard to see how they
could develop the relevant skills without knowing some important facts.
This is, I suspect, the general case. Skillfully bringing the right considera-
tions to bear on a problem requires, and is probably the causal consequence
of, knowing a lot of relevant facts. (Tsai (2014) makes clear how one can
simultaneously hold that skills are in part constituted by knowledge of facts
without having an intellectualist picture of skill.)
But what of the other two intellectualist theories? Do we have reason to
think that there are some skills that are not constituted by, or not caused by,
the possession of factual knowledge? One way to quickly show that would
be to show that there can be skills without the related knowledge. Perhaps
that's not just sucient for rejecting Constitutive/Causal Intellectualism,
but necessary. If knowledge without skills is possible, as in Alice and Bob's
cases, and skills without knowledge were impossible, that asymmetry would
call out for explanation. And something in the vicinity of Constitutive or
Causal Intellectualism would be a very good candidate explanation.
There are (at least) two promising routes to showing that there can
be skills without knowledge. One is due to Imogen Dickie (2012). She
argues that since there are so many dierent routes to skill than there are to
knowledge, we should expect that there will be cases of skill that are causally
prior to knowledge. Jason Stanley (2012) replies that Dickie's argument
assumes an overly narrow conception of propositional knowledge. This is a
fascinating debate, but I don't have anything useful to add to it, so I'll just
note the existence of this route, and move on.
The other route is due to Yuri Cath (2011). He suggests that facts in
virtue of which a person might lose propositional knowledge do not always
bring about a loss of knowledge that. I'm going to sketch a Cath-style
argument that we can have intellectual skills without knowledge. I think
the argument has some force, though there are more ways to resist it than
there are to resist the argument against Identity Intellectualism.
Ross and Rachel are economics students taking an exam. They are given
a hard question asking about the likely eects of an exogenous shock, say
an earthquake aecting an area the supplies crucial raw materials, on some
related markets. The question is hard, with the relevant causal pathways
being interconnected and often opposing. The only plausible way forward
is to use a model and search for equilibrium points in the model. That's
what Ross and Rachel have both been taught to do. And in fact both of
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them quickly select the right kind of model, with just the right amount of
complexity in it to answer the question without being overburdened, and
set out on the dicult algebra involved in solving the question.
So far it looks like both Ross and Rachel have shown intellectual skill.
Now it turns out Ross and Rachel have very dierent views about the role
of models in economic thinking. (My own thinking about models has been
heavily inuenced by (Strevens, 2008, ch. 8) and Davey (2011), and I rely on
their insights in what follows.) These models involve, as all models do, some
serious idealisation. Most notably, they assume that all the relevant actors
are perfectly rational utility maximisers. Rachel hasn't given much thought
to this assumption, though she knows it to be literally false. But if pressed,
she would say some reasonably sensible things about why she was using
the model. For one thing, the familiar failures of human rationality aren't
obviously relevant to the puzzle being presented. For another, they've been
taught that using these models is a good way to solve problems, and that
testimonial evidence carries some weight. And for another, it's an exam, and
it is likely that questions have been selected to test how well students can use
the models they have been taught. If those are her background, implicit,
views, I think it is plausible to say that Rachel knows that the model is
relevant to the exam question, even if she couldn't produce a theory of
idealisations in economics of the standards of the best philosophers.
Ross's views about models are rather dierent. He thinks the familiar
models in economics work, when they do, because the background assump-
tions are strictly and literally true. He thinks economic agents are utility
maximisers, and the apparent evidence to the contrary is due to sloppy ex-
perimental design. He thinks markets are always in general equilibrium.
And so he thinks that the only sources of error in predictions we can make
about markets are from errors about things like the costs of extracting raw
materials after the earthquake. This perspective is, of course, grossly mis-
taken. Moreover, Ross thinks that if the assumptions were not correct,
there would be no point in using the models. This too is a mistake, though
perhaps not as dramatic as his other mistakes.
Now even if Ross and Rachel aren't thinking about these philosophical
views about the nature of models, I think they are relevant to whether each
of them know that the models are relevant to the puzzle. In particular, I
think Rachel does know that the models are relevant, while Ross's belief
that they are relevant is more like a lucky guess than a piece of knowledge.
Still, I think we should say that Ross showed skill in using this model rather
than a more or less complex model, or a dierent kind of model, or no model
at all. So he is a case of intellectual skill without knowledge of relevance.
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I don't think this case is conclusive. I can think of at least four ways
someone might reasonably object to the case.
1. It might be argued that despite his false views about why the models
are relevant, he really does know that they are relevant. In other
words, we would have another counterexample, to be added to those
discussed by Wareld (2005) and Luzzi (2010), to the theory that false
beliefs cannot generate knowledge.
2. It might be argued that Ross is not really skilled, since it is a matter of
luck that the falsity of his beliefs does not lead him to false conclusions
here.
3. It might be argued that although Ross doesn't know that this model is
relevant, his skill is constituted by, or caused by, some other knowledge
he has.
4. It might be argued that the broad picture of the role of idealisations
in scientic reasoning that I'm adopting from Strevens and Davey is
mistaken, and this fatally undermines my use of the case to argue
against intellectualism.
I don't think these arguments are going to ultimately work. But it's
clear we are a long way from Rylean regress arguments here. And that's
where I think the debate about regress arguments should end. We have
a good argument against Identity Intellectualism. And we have some sug-
gestive considerations that seem to tell against Constitutive and Causal
Intellectualism, but whether these arguments ultimately work will depend
on considerations independent of the regress.
Objection: Stanley andWilliamson (forthcoming) have recently defended
the idea that skill is a disposition to form knowledge. And they back this
up with empirical analysis of intelligent motor skills, especially drawing on
the survey by Yarrow et al. (2009). Is this kind of intellectualism subject to
the regress worries?
Reply : Once we are taking the dispositions themselves to be the skills,
not the underlying knowledge, it feels that we are a long way from tradi-
tional intellectualism. But the view is independently interesting, and it is
a useful segue to thinking about the relationship between intellectual skills,
as conceived of in this paper, and motor skills.
I've already mentioned that the Bob example does not seem to t well
with Stanley and Williamson's paradigm. And there is something suspicious
about a theory of physical skill that divorces it so strongly from the physical.
To be a skilled batsman requires more than dispositions to get knowledge,
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one might suspect. Stanley and Williamson have a reply to this suspicion.
They write,
Consider the dierence between someone who can bench-press a
maximum of 100 pounds and someone who can bench press 150
pounds. We may suppose that both employ the same technique;
only brute strength makes the dierence between them. Both are
equally skilled ...Any view of skill must account for such cases.
In particular, it must explain why strength, speed, and stamina
are not themselves skills.(Stanley and Williamson, forthcoming,
9, page references to preprint)
But even if strength is not a skill, it might be a prerequisite for a skill. A
batsman whose degenerative back condition means he lacks the exibility
to deploy his trademark pull shot has lost a skill, even if he hasn't lost any
dispositions to form knowledge. There is a puzzle as to why qualitative
physical dierences matter so much to skill attributions why quantitative
ones do not. If you can't turn to pull the ball, you've lost a skill, but if
a muscle strength decline reduces the power of your pull shot, your skills
haven't declined. But that dierence doesn't justify making skills entirely
cognitive.
Still, there is a cognitive angle. One central point of this paper is com-
pletely consistent with Stanley and Williamson's picture; motor skills often
require forming the right knowledge. The skilled batsman doesn't just pick
up many characteristics of the bowler's delivery, they pick up the ones that
are most relevant to the trajectory of the ball. As the Bob example shows,
they also have to activate that knowledge for it really to be a skill, but that's
not a new objection.
There is one other cognitive aspect of motor skill that Yarrow et al.
(2009) draw attention to, and which ts very nicely with the theme of this
paper. It's a specic instance of a much more wide-ranging skill. Sometimes
an agent knows that in some time some evidence, drawn from a large space,
will come in. She will shortly thereafter have to act in response to the
evidence. She has some time to plan now. What should she do? In many
such cases, backwards induction is impossible; there are too many possible
pieces of evidence that could come in, and planning for each of them is a
waste of resources. On the other hand, not planning at all is also a waste
of the time she now has, and will lack once the evidence comes in. The
solution is to do some planning. And there is a real skill involved in getting
the resource allocation right, and neither wasting eort planning for unlikely
scenarios, nor wasting the ability to be prepared before one needs to act.
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Yarrow et al. (2009, 590-1) suggest the same thing happens at a very low
level. Highly skilled athletes are making many places in advance of knowing
exactly how they will act. Part of the skill involved is allocating the right
resources to each of these planning activities. Many of them will ultimately
be wasteful, since they are plans for eventualities that do not arise. And
one failure condition is that a single plan is not selected, and the agent
performs some combination of multiple plans that are worse than either one
plan. That failure state is part of the evidence that there is this low-level
planning going on before actions. But it is a real skill, and part of the skill
is focussing on just the right things.
So motor skills often have as a constituent part intellectual skills. Some
of those skills are closely tied to knowledge; for instance, having priors that
track frequencies. Sometimes the skill involved is in focussing on the evi-
dence that the posterior probability is maximally sensitive to, and reacting
to that evidence. Sometimes the skill is not attending to evidence that is just
going to be unhelpful noise in the activity in question (Yarrow et al., 2009,
589). And sometimes it is in allocating just the right resources to forward
planning. All of these seem like intellectual skills, and parts of motor skills.
We could try to squeeze all of them into a framework of being dispositions to
form knowledge, but it seems more perspicuous to just present the plurality
of ways in which the intellect and the body interact, rather than trying to
nd a single framework.
Objection: Appeal to skill does not stop the regress. If we need to posit
something, say a skill, that comes between the possession of knowledge and
the use of knowledge in reasoning or action, then we also to posit something
that comes between the possession of a skill, and the use of that skill in
reasoning or action. (Compare (Stanley, 2011, p. 26)).
Reply : What I'm going to say here is similar to what Jeremy Fantl (2011)
said in a response to an earlier version of Stanley's argument, so I'll be brief.
Skills are dispositions. We don't need to posit anything that comes between
the disposition and its triggering. If a string is disposed to produce a middle
C when struck, and it is struck, we don't need to posit an extra intermediary
between the striking and the note. Dispositions stop regresses.
But, you might insist, couldn't the same be true of knowledge? After all,
on a broadly functionalist construal of the mental, knowledge is a kind of
disposition. My reply is in theory knowledge could stop such a regress, but in
practice it is unlikely. An agent could be facing a problem where the possible
considerations and options can be enumerated without using any particular
skill, and the options are few enough that they can be each considered in
turn. That is the situation an agent playing a relatively simple game might
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face. But it isn't the general human condition. In practice, we face problems
every moment where it requires skill to bring the right considerations to bear,
at least given the processing capacities we have available.
Objection: There are semantic arguments that attributions of know how
are attributions of propositional knowledge. This shows that Ryle was wrong
to draw a broad distinction between know how and know that.
Reply : I'm not making any claims about either know how or about
`know how'. I am making some claims about skill, and those imply some
claims about `skill'. But I'm sympathetic to the idea that reports of know
how are often reports of some kind of practical propositional knowledge. I
certainly haven't oered any arguments, nor I think any considerations in
the direction of an argument, against this view.
Indeed, there are a lot of intellectualst positions that I'm not arguing
against here. Anti-intellectualism is often tied up with the view that there
is an important distinction between theoretical and practical elds. The ar-
guments I've developed here suggest that if there is such a distinction, then
proving mathematical theorems is on the `practical' side. I think that's a
strange enough conclusion that it is time to change our terminology. That's
why I've talked about the distinction between intellectual skills and knowl-
edge, not the distinction (if such there is) between know how and know that,
or between praxis and theory.
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